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                             A b s t r a c t  
 
      I n  t h i s  s h o r t  n o t e  I  r e v i e w  t h e  B a nk of Japan’s monetary policy since its exit 
from the so-called quantitative easing regime early in 2006. The major characteristic of 
the policy stance during the period, called Strategy 2 below, has been to adjust the 
policy interest rate gradually upward in response to a healthy real economy despite 
stagnant behavior in consumer prices. Such a policy stance can be contrasted with a 
hypothetical strategy, Strategy 1, whereby the Bank of Japan would have kept the policy 
rate at lower levels, possibly at zero percent, until inflation starts to show an upward 
trend more clearly. The two strategies are compared on many fronts with particular 
attention to well-known recent empirical regularities about inflation —a smaller 
response of inflation to output and larger uncertainties about the response. Various 
comparisons of the two strategies offered here, though far from conclusive, tend to 
support Strategy 1 over Strategy 2. In my discussion of the two strategies I also 




     This short paper reviews the Bank of Japan (BOJ)’s monetary policy since it 
exited from the so-called Quantitative Easing (QE) framework in March 2006, and in so 
doing comments briefly on Nishimura’s article in this issue. 
          The major point of the paper is that the stubbornly low rate of inflation of Japan’s 
consumer price index (CPI), despite the strong real economy in recent years, has made 
the task of the BOJ unusually difficult, and raised a number of questions about its basic 
policy stance as well as its communication with the market. Since the exit from QE in 
March 2006, the BOJ has been able to raise the policy interest rate only twice, given the 
slower than expected rise in the rate of core CPI inflation. Even such a timid tightening 
has raised questions about its necessity, given the stagnant behavior of inflation. In light  2
of this, I discuss below cases for and against the BOJ’s recent approach by comparing 
them with those of an alternative strategy where the BOJ held rates at lower levels, 
possibly at zero percent. The comparison is done from a number of angles, including 
inflation targeting aspects of the issue and the relationship between asset prices and 
monetary policy. By proceeding this way, I think we would be able to understand better 
Nishimura’s or the BOJ’s view on monetary policy. 
     Before proceeding further, it would useful to summarize Nishimura’s article in 
this issue briefly at this point. He first points out that the volatility of Japan’s real GDP 
growth rate has declined since around 2002 and then speculates that this might be 
related to a substantial increase in the diversity of demand for final goods and services 
across industries. He provides evidence for the latter point by showing that the cross 
sectional correlation of industry activities declined after 2002. He goes on to construct a 
theoretical model of output pricing by firms in which there is confusion between macro 
and micro demand shocks. A positive shock to the demand for a firm’s product, when 
perceived to be macroeconomic, tends to result in a rise in output price because other 
firms are also likely to follow suit and the firm is less likely to lose demand for its 
product. Turning to the implication of such an analysis, Nishimura argues that as a result 
of the reduced inter-industry correlation of activities observed in the data  firms are 
now more likely to regard shocks to the demand for their product as microeconomic and, 
hence, do not respond to them by changing prices. Aggregating over firms, one obtains 
a smaller response of prices to output—that is, a flatter Phillips curve. Using 
macroeconomic data, Nishimura then estimates a Phillips curve and an IS equation. He 
finds that both the inflation response to output and output response to the interest rate 
have become smaller and less predictable recently. Finally, he concludes that such an 
environment supports the recent BOJ’s approach to monetary policy—one of gradually 
raising interest rates despite a weak reading on the inflation front. 
     The  major  contribution  of  the  Nishimura  article is his explanation of the flat slope 
of the recent Phillips curve. This, however, is only one of the many existing 
explanations of the phenomenon. Other explanations include increased global 
competition and stable inflation expectations. Choosing between these hypotheses is 
beyond the scope of the present note. Thus, in the following I will concentrate on other 
aspects of the Nishimura paper. That is, the phenomenon of the flat Phillips curve, 
increasing uncertainty of the slope of the curve, and his discussion of the implications of 
these for monetary policy. 
          In the next section, section 2, I briefly review the BOJ’s policy after its exit from 
QE in March 2006. In section 3, I discuss the performance of the CPI inflation rate  3
during the period and the BOJ’s overestimates of the inflation rate. In section 4, I try to 
offer some justification of the BOJ’s policy stance. But this attempt immediately draws 
attention to an alternative policy strategy of keeping a zero rate until inflation becomes 
more clearly positive. Thus, in section 5 I turn to the comparison of the two strategies 
from a number of angles. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2, The BOJ’s Monetary Policy since early 2006 
     In March of 2001 the BOJ adopted the QE framework whereby it would keep 
injecting large amounts of excess reserves until core CPI inflation became stably 
positive.
1 Measured by the CPI that uses the benchmark year of 2000, inflation rose to 
0.5% in January 2006, and the BOJ decided to exit from QE. The BOJ stated in its 
announcement of policy decision on March 9, 2006 that 
     “Year on year changes in the consumer price index are expected to remain 
positive. The Bank, therefore, judged that the conditions laid out in the commitment 
(contained in QE) are fulfilled.”
2 
     In  fact,  the  inflation  rate stayed at around 0.5% for a few months and rose to 0.7% 
in August 2006. (See the inflation rate movement that uses the benchmark year of 2000 
in Figure 1.)   
     The March 2006 decision to exit from QE involved a switch of the operating 
target of monetary policy from the current account balances at the BOJ to the overnight 
call market rate. The level of the target was set initially at 0% in March 2006.   
     In addition to the change in the operating target of policy, the BOJ announced a 
new monetary policy framework in March 2006. The framework consisted of the 
definition of price stability and two principles, called pillars, that would guide monetary 
policy making. The definition of price stability was a collection of individual board 
members’ preferred inflation ranges and turned out to be [0%, 2%]. The BOJ hastened 
to add that this was not an official inflation target range of the Bank. The first of the two 
pillars contained in the new monetary policy framework dictated that policy would be 
set so that the economy would achieve sustainable output growth under inflation rates 
consistent with the definition of price stability over a horizon of one to two years. The 
second pillar cautioned that policy may deviate from what the first pillar suggested if 
risks of unstable output and or inflation movements over a longer run were significant.     
     Seeing  the  rise  in  inflation  toward  summer, the BOJ decided to raise the target for 
the call rate to 0.25% in July 2006. The BOJ stated in its policy statement that 
                                                  
1  See Ueda(2005) for a detailed account of this framework. 
2  The expression in the parentheses is by the present author.  4
     “Maintaining the previous level of the policy interest rate may result in large 
swings in economic activity and prices in the future. ….The Bank will adjust the level 
of the policy interest rate gradually in the light of developments in economic activity 
and prices if they follow the projection presented in the Outlook Report…” 
Unfortunately, inflation peaked in August at 0.7% and started to decline after that. 
In October it fell to 0.4% even using the data before the benchmark revision. The 
benchmark revision of CPI in August lowered inflation significantly and inflation was 
only 0.1% in October based on the new index. 
     The media and market started to question the March decision to exit from QE or 
the July decision to raise the call rate. The real economy was showing a temporary sign 
of weakness--a quarter on quarter real GDP growth rate of -0.1% in 2006Q3--and 
observers thought that a further hike in the policy rate might be difficult.       
     The  BOJ,  however, maintained  that its economic outlook outlined in the Outlook 
Report was basically intact and looked eager to raise the policy rate. Such a stance of 
the BOJ and press reports of a high likelihood of a January 2007 rate hike invited strong 
comments against such an action from some influential politicians right before the 
January 2007 monetary policy meeting. The BOJ stayed on hold in the January meeting, 
but decided to raise the policy rate to 0.5% in the February meeting. Meanwhile, 
inflation fell to -0.1% in January and further to -0.3% in March. 
     The January 2007 fiasco over a possible rate hike culminating in the decision to 
stay on hold in January and the subsequent decision to raise the policy rate in February 
in the midst of a decline in the inflation rate to negative territory have created the 
unfortunate perception that the guiding principle of the BOJ’s policy making was 
unclear. 
 
3, Large Inflation Forecast Error 
     One of the most serious problems the BOJ faced during the last two years has 
been the failure of the CPI to rise. This is apparent in Figures 2 and 3. They show the 
median of the BOJ board members’ forecast ranges of real GDP growth rate and core 
CPI inflation rate. The forecasts are taken from Outlook Reports in April 2006, October 
2006 and April 2007. While the growth forecasts were not revised much during the 12 
months, the inflation forecasts were revised down sharply. Thus, as of April 2006 the 
median forecast (henceforth, the BOJ’s forecast) was 0.9 % for fiscal year 2007. It came 
down, however, to 0.5% in October 2006, and further down to 0.1% as of April 2007. 
      The large overestimates of inflation were due to two factors. First, as stated in 
the last section, the CPI data went through a benchmark revision in the summer of 2006.  5
The timing of the revision was known, but the size of the revision, somewhere between 
0.3%-0.5% depending on at what point one measures the difference between the two 
indexes, was larger than expected. Figure 1 shows, however, that whichever definition 
of CPI inflation one looks at, one obtains the conclusion that it peaked in August 2006, 
and then started to decline after that. Under the new definition, it dropped into negative 
territory again in March 2007 and stayed there since then. 
     The  second  reason  for  the  disappointing inflation performance has been the weak 
response of inflation to output growth. Figure 4 and Figure 5 show how the Phillips 
Curve has become flatter recently. They plot the inflation of a trend component of core 
CPI against a measure of the GDP gap officially published by the Cabinet Office for 
1980-2007Q1 in Figure 4 and for 1998-2007Q1 in Figure5.
3 It is apparent that the 
curve is flatter recently. A simple regression of inflation on a constant and the gap 
results in a slope of .62 (.067) in the former, and .076 (.041) in the latter.
4 Figure 6 
displays the time series behavior of the trend component of the core CPI inflation 
rate—the so-called core of the core CPI inflation rate.
5  It may be seen that the response 
of inflation to output has not only become smaller but also more uncertain. For example, 
Figure 6 shows that prior to the spring of 2006 inflation did respond, if mildly, to the 
growth in output, while it has stopped rising at all since then. Nishimura makes a similar 
point by referring to a significant rise in the standard error of the estimate of the slope of 
the Phillips curve after 2000Q3. 
          The tendency for the slope of the Phillips curve to become flatter is a world-wide 
phenomenon and has invited many attempts at explanation. It seems fair to say, however, 
that none have been totally satisfactory. The near-term relationship between inflation 
and output remains very uncertain. 
     To summarize, inflation has been falling since the BOJ raised the policy rate in 
July 2006 and it is, at the time of the writing of this article, in negative territory. The 
inflation rate of -0.1% in August 2007 is, if marginally, below the definition of price 
stability, [0%, 2%], of the BOJ board members. The weakness in inflation has been 
largely unanticipated. Despite this, the BOJ raised the policy rate again in February 
2007. The policy rate is still at 0.5% and there is not much room for easing monetary 
policy to counter a major negative shock to the economy. 
                                                  
3  The core CPI excludes fresh foods from the CPI. The trend component of core CPI here is 
calculated by taking away from core CPI rice, petroleum products, public medical fees and 
tobacco. After 2000, mobile phone fees are also excluded. 
4  The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
5  There is no official definition of the core of the core CPI. Most researchers take away energy 
related items, public medical fees, mobile phone charges and a few other one-off factors from 
core CPI to form core core CPI.  6
 
4, Trying to Make Sense of the BOJ’s Monetary Policy since early 2006: Two 
Alternative Monetary Policy Approaches under Low Rates of Inflation 
     The BOJ’s rate hikes when inflation is close to, or below the lower end of the 
price stability range have been under attack. Is it, however, really impossible to justify a 
rate hike by an inflation targeting central bank when inflation is very low or when it is 
well below the target? Of course, an obvious policy alternative in such a situation would 
be to lower rates in an attempt to raise inflation. I will not attempt to discuss this 
alternative given that the policy rate in Japan is still very close to zero and the room for 
easing is very much limited.
6 Below I first outline the basic structure of possible 
arguments to justify a rate hike in such a situation. Then, in the next section I examine 
more carefully how plausible such arguments are in the light of the current Japanese 
situation. 
   There are at least two ways to justify a rate hike when inflation is below target. 
First, one could argue that the actual GDP exceeds potential GDP—the GDP gap is 
positive—and that this is by itself costly even if it does not lead to a significant rise in 
inflation. In fact, the GDP gap estimated by the Japanese government as shown in 
Figures 4 and 5 has been positive since 2006Q4. Whether the output gap can really 
become positive or even if it can, what exactly the associated costs are is a difficult 
question. I will touch upon this question later, but for the time being let us assume that 
such costs are non-negligible. That is, we consider a central bank who attempts to 
minimize a loss function defined over the deviation of inflation from target and the 
output gap.   
     The  second  justification  for  a  rate  hike would go as follows. Suppose that today’s 
inflation is well below target. Normally, the central bank would contemplate lowering 
the policy rate. The central bank, however, may have an inflation outlook whereby 
inflation will exceed the target in the near future if the policy rate is held at the current 
level. The cost of inflation overshooting in the future may be larger than the near term 
cost of inflation staying below the target.   
          Let us take up the second of these two possibilities and examine what the central 
bank should do. One obvious strategy (Strategy 1) would be for the central bank to wait 
until inflation becomes much closer to target before it starts to raise the policy rate. The 
other (Strategy 2) would be to start raising the policy rate today and try to achieve a 
                                                  
6  There is yet another difficult question--that is, whether or not, the exit from QE in March 
2006 was appropriate given the fact that inflation went back to negative territory in less than a 
year after the exit.  7
smooth and gradual convergence of the policy rate to its neutral level, which 
presumably is well above today’s level. The justification of Strategy 2 is that waiting for 
too long until inflation rises significantly as in Strategy 1 may lead to a non-negligible 
period of overly high rate of inflation. Alternatively, one could point to the cost of a 
positive GDP gap. Such seems to be close to the position of the BOJ. In fact, Nishimura 
states that 
     “To stand pat for a long time is not a prudent strategy, since the acceleration of 
economic activity may in the future come to require a large adjustment in the policy rate, 
causing unnecessary swings in economic activity and prices.” 
There is a third justification of a rate hike embedded in the above remark. That is, a 
sharp adjustment of the policy rate could be by itself costly. So, a prudent central bank 
would start early, but proceed gradually when a large adjustment in the policy rate in the 
near future seems necessary. 
     To digress slightly, under Strategy 2 the speed with which the policy rate is 
expected to converge to the neutral level seems to become an important policy variable. 
Nishimura states that 
     “Policy  adjustment  cannot  be  pre-scheduled or occur at some fixed interval, since 
it should be in line with the general economic improvement, which never follows a 
fixed schedule.”   
He goes on to justify the January 2007 decision to stay on hold along the same lines: 
          “there was a slight pause in the trend of general economic improvement in the last 
quarter of last year. A prudent policymaker should take this pause seriously and wait 
until the clouds over the trend have lifted somewhat. That is what the majority of the 
Policy Board did last December and this January.” 
 
5, Comparing the Two Strategies 
     I now turn to the discussion of a most difficult issue of whether or not the BOJ’s 
adoption of Strategy 2 under the recent environment is justifiable. Needless to say, it 
would be impossible to paint a black or white type picture here. After examining the 
issue from various angles, however, I will tentatively conclude that the balance of the 
argument favors Strategy 1 rather than Strategy 2. 
 
(5-1) The target rate of inflation 
          The outcome of such an analysis obviously depends on the target rate of inflation. 
The BOJ, however, has not made clear what their target rate of inflation is. The only 
thing the BOJ has announced so far is the [0%, 2%] definition of price stability.  8
Unfortunately, it is not clear how this is constraining monetary policy. A rate hike 
decision near a zero percent inflation rate can easily be justified if the target was 0%, 
while this may not be the case with a target of 2%. Simply put, even if [0%, 2%] was an 
inflation target range, it would be too wide to determine monetary policy.   
     Let us provisionally proceed on the assumption that the target rate of inflation is 
either 1%, the mid point of the range, or slightly higher, for example, 1.5%. Assuming 
that the equilibrium real rate of interest is 1.5%, the actual rate of inflation of -0.1%, the 
GDP gap of 0.9% (for 2007Q1 as estimated by the Cabinet Office) and putting equal 
weights of 0.5 to the inflation and GDP gaps, one obtains a Taylor rule rate of 1.3% with 
an inflation target of 1.0% and a 1.05% policy interest rate with an inflation target of 
1.5%. Even with a 2% target, the policy rate is still 0.8%. All these hypothetical policy 
rates are higher than the actual, which is 0.5%. If these calculations were relevant, the 
choice of inflation target within the range of [0%, 2%] would be in a sense immaterial. 
The BOJ, even after the exit from QE, would still be deliberately moving behind the 
curve and is in a slow transition process to a normal central bank which would set the 
policy rate according to, say, the Taylor rule.
7  Such a line of thinking seems to support 
Strategy 2. 
      
(5.2) Implications of the smaller and more uncertain slope of the Phillips curve 
          How would the decline in the slope of the Phillips curve affect the analysis in the 
last section? Also, what would be the implication of increased uncertainty of the slope? 
          The smaller slope of the Phillips curve has a clear implication for monetary policy. 
Since the same amount of a change in the interest rate generates a smaller rise in the rate 
of inflation, a larger change in the interest rate is required if inflation is away from 
target. In the current Japanese context, assuming that inflation target is much higher 
than 0%, an inflation rate of near 0% calls for a longer continuation of a near 0% policy 
interest rate. That is, Strategy 1 is preferable to Strategy 2. Let us put this in terms of the 
Taylor rule type argument. Solving an optimization problem for a central bank that 
minimizes costs arising from deviations of inflation from target (and the GDP gap) 
results in a Taylor-rule-like equation that places larger weight on the deviation of 
inflation from target if the inflation response to output is smaller. Thus, although a 
weight of 0.5 was attached to this term in the calculation in the previous section, the 
weight could be much larger. With a weight of 2, the optimal policy rate can be seen to 
                                                  
7  Of course, even in this case the speed of the rate adjustment would be a function of the target 
rate of inflation.  9
be still negative.
8 A smaller interest rate elasticity of aggregate demand leads to a 
similar conclusion.
9 Consequently, consideration of the implication of a smaller slope 
of the Phillips curve tends to weaken the case for Strategy 2. 
     What about the uncertainty of the slope of the Phillips curve? This certainly 
lowers the controllability of inflation. Suppose, as we have been assuming, that a central 
bank has multiple objectives. That is, in addition to price stability, it is concerned with 
the stability of output and /or the financial system. To the extent that the central bank 
has discretion over the weights given to these objectives, a decline in the controllability 
of inflation seems to lower the weight attached to price stability and raise the weights on 
other objectives. This may favor Strategy 2 at the expense of Strategy 1. It is, however, 
a fine point. If the interest rate elasticity of aggregate demand has also become uncertain 
as Nishimura claims, the weight given to output would also decline. It is then not clear 
what effects this discussion will have on the merits and demerits of the two strategies. 
     A more relevant consideration regarding the implication for monetary policy of 
the increased uncertainty of the slope of the Phillips curve seems to be the following. 
Given lags in the effects of monetary policy, central banks ought to forecast future 
inflation when setting the current policy rate. In this forecasting exercise central banks 
use information on the current state of the economy and the past statistical relationship 
among macroeconomic variables. For example, an analysis of data over the past two 
decades may indicate that a rise of output growth of 1% during the next year will 
generate a 0.5% rise in the rate of inflation, which may have policy implications. A rise 
in the uncertainty about the relationship between the two variables, however, forces the 
central bank to wait for a while to see if the data show the tendency to conform to the 
past relationship before making a decision on policy. That is, policy decisions would 
depend more on incoming data. Such a consideration seems to clearly favor Strategy 1 
rather than Strategy 2. Inflation in Japan today is not rising by as much as the past 
relationship between inflation and output suggests. A natural reaction would be to wait 
until a clearer trend in inflation becomes discernible.   
 
(5.3) Risk Management Type Considerations   
     I have already touched upon some risk management issues above. A more 
straightforward analysis of risks associated with the two strategies would go as follows. 
                                                  
8  The weight on the deviation of inflation from target is dependent on the inverse of the slope of 
the Phillips curve. See, for example, Svensson (1997) or Ball (1997). 
9  More precisely, a smaller interest rate elasticity of aggregate demand raises both the weight on 
the inflation term and the GDP gap. So long as the GDP gap is small, however, the essential 
feature of the argument here remains true.  10
Strategy 1, by maintaining low interest rates for a long period, increases upside risks for 
the economy. Strategy 2 would entail the opposite, downside risks. Attempts to raise 
interest rates may generate adverse effects on the economy and inflation, which is 
already in negative territory, and inflation may remain subdued for a long period to 
come.  
        There are at least two fronts on which to evaluate these risks. First, the costs of the 
risks of the two strategies are obviously a function of the target rate of inflation. With a 
target of 0% inflation, upside risks of Strategy 1 are significant, while downside risks of 
Strategy 2 need to be taken seriously if the target was 2%. The BOJ will have to make 
clearer at least what subset of the [0%, 2%] range is more preferable to the rest. Without 
this, the continuation of Strategy 2 with emphasis on upside risks could be taken as 
revelation of preference for a very low inflation rate. 
    The second important point about the comparison of the risks associated with the 
two strategies is the asymmetric nature of the costs of deviations of inflation from target. 
The zero bound on nominal interest rates makes deflation a very serious cost for a 
central bank because it largely deprives the central bank of the ability to stimulate the 
economy to stop deflation. On the other hand, the central bank has an infinite amount of 
room to adjust the policy rate upward. This is in fact a major lesson of the experience of 
the BOJ during the period since 1998. This consideration obviously supports Strategy 1. 
          I may add the following point to the above discussion. Currently, the GDP gap is 
close to, or slightly above zero in Japan while inflation is still around zero. Although 
hard to measure, inflation expectations must be close to zero as well. Under such a 
circumstance, attempts to raise inflation substantially will necessarily create a period of 
overshooting, that is, a period of a large positive GDP gap. Trying to avoid overheating 
too much may end up in the failure to raise inflation. 
     It  may  be  appropriate  also  to  comment on what the costs, other than an increase in 
inflation, of an overheating economy could be. One easy answer would be, as the BOJ 
claims, “large swings in prices and economic activity in the long run.” Inflation may 
rise substantially in five years if not in two years. Business investment can go too far, 
leading to a sharp stock adjustment process later on. These are certainly valid arguments, 
but do not seem to be very serious concerns for Japan at the moment. For example, 
firms are not spending more than retained profits, and hence bank loans are not 
growing.  
     Another possible cost of an overheating economy would be large swings in asset 
prices and their effects on the stability of the financial system. In fact, Japan 
experienced this in a harsh way during the last two decades. The recent sub-prime  11
mortgage loan problem and its spread to the worldwide credit market and financial 
system is also a relevant example. Again, this is an important concern. Apart from the 
weakness in the yen that turned on low Japanese interest rates, however, world asset 
price movements including the possible credit market “bubble” do not seem to be the 
result of low interest rates in Japan. Domestic asset prices in Japan are only beginning 
to reverse the decade long downward adjustment. Worrying about bubbles at this stage 
does not seem to very convincing.           
 
6, Concluding Remarks 
     The foregoing discussion seems to suggest that the balance of the argument 
supports Strategy 1 relative to Strategy 2. This is, of course, not a conclusion without 
qualifications, as I have argued in many places in this note. History may well show a 
few years from today that the BOJ policy during the last two years was reasonable. 
Even if this were the case, the point still remains that the BOJ’s strategy and its 
justification has not been clearly transmitted to its observers. At least, a narrower 
definition of price stability or inflation target range would be necessary, not just for 
communication with the market but also for sound policy making itself. 
     I would end with a few more remarks about issues discussed above. First is an 
intrinsic difficulty for the BOJ to adopt inflation targeting in the current environment of 
near zero inflation and a zero nominal interest rate. Even if the ultimate inflation target 
of the BOJ was 2%, announcing this immediately might not be a wise move. As Ueda 
(2005) argued extensively, with a near zero nominal interest rate there are serious 
limitations to what a central bank can do to increase the rate of inflation significantly. A 
mere announcement of a high target rate of inflation by itself does not seem to be much 
of a help unless it is accompanied by concrete measures to hit the target. QE was one 
such measure, but the BOJ has exited from the framework. One realistic approach 
would be to target a lower inflation rate in the short run, but with an eye to raising it if 
circumstances turn out to allow such a revision—an opportunistic approach. Such an 
approach involves a number of difficult problems including how to contain possible risk 
premiums on long-term interest rates arising from the uncertainty about inflation target. 
It appears, however, that announcing a little more about its longer-run strategy would 
help in terms of healthier communication with the market and media. 
    The second point concerns another dimension by which to compare Strategies 1 
and 2. One of the major justifications for a positive inflation target is to secure some 
safety margin for lowering interest rates given the zero lower bound on the nominal 
interest rate. Which strategy would do better in terms of securing a safety margin? The  12
answer is not obvious. Strategy 1, by maintaining low policy rates for a long period, 
tries to bring the economy to a high inflation, high interest rate equilibrium. In the short 
run, however, the central bank is not able to create a large increase in safety margin. In 
contrast, Strategy 2 attempts to secure a small margin quickly, though by doing so it 
may not succeed in creating a large margin even in the long run. Thus, there is a clear 
tradeoff here. Depending on the preference of policymakers, either choice seems 
justifiable. If we were to place the discussion in the current Japanese context, however, 
even Strategy 2 has generated only a 50 basis point margin for the policy rate above the 
zero bound. It may be possible to generate a further rise in the policy rate, but relative to 
what Strategy 1 would have delivered—most likely still a zero rate—the margin seems 
too small as a preparation for a negative shock. 
     Finally, there are questions about the price index central banks should be 
watching or targeting. Currently in Japan, the CPI is not rising, but most of the other 
price indexes, including the corporate goods price index and corporate service price 
index are rising. The deflator for investment is also rising. One wonders whether the 
focus on the core CPI might distort monetary policy making or not. This is a legitimate 
question. Given that wages and the deflator for consumption are also weak, however, 
the weakness in the CPI seems to be real. Thus, unless one can make a strong case for 
targeting a broader index such as the deflator for domestic demand, one needs to take 
seriously the weakness in the CPI in the discussion of monetary policy. 
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